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English-Only Rules in the Workplace 
and the Courts' Response1 
Keith Walters 
1 Introduction 
I am not an attorney, though I have lived with one for a number of years. 
Among the things he has taught me is that anytime I express an opinion 
about a legal matter, I should begin with a disclaimer acknowledging that I 
am not an attorney and that nothing I say should be construed as constituting 
legal advice. Hence, I repeat in direct discourse, "I am not an attorney, and 
nothing I say should be construed as constituting legal advice." This speech 
act, necessary to protect myself from being accused of practicing law with-
out a license, reminds us that, as Bourdieu (1991) observed, the right to 
speak and the right to be heard are not the same-{)r from a slightly different 
perspective, being authorized to speak is not the same as being authorized to 
be heard and to have one's word valued. Questions of authority include not 
only matters of when and whether one is authorized to speak but also which 
language or languages one may or may not use when speaking. 
In this essay, I examine English-Only in the workplace rules and rulings, 
not as an attorney, but as a sociolinguist currently serving as an expert 
witness in a case involving these issues, as a teacher, and as a citizen. Be-
cause the case in which I am involved is still pending and because I know 
very few facts of the case-which is as it should be since I was asked to 
comment initially on questions relating to the nature of bilingualism and 
codeswitching, rather than matters of fact-I have nothing else to say about 
the case itself. Rather, I am concerned with more general issues relating to 
language and sociolingusitics raised by English-Only rules in the workplace 
and rulings about these rules. Following this introduction, in section 2, I 
provide some background about English-Only rules in the workplace. In 
section 3, I seek to make several observations about recurring assumptions in 
discussions of these rules, questioning in particular whether current meta-
phors and models from our discipline may, in some ways, misrepresent the 
opinions we as sociolinguists and linguists actually hold about the topics in 
1 Special thanks to Tricia Cukor-A vi! a for providing me with two documents dis-
cussed here and to Michal Brody, Susan Berk-Seligson, and Jonathan Tamez for 
other assistance. Thanks also to the audience at NW A V for the rich discussion 
following my delivery of the oral version of this paper. 
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question. In section 4, I analyze the language of some of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's guidelines relating to English-Only rules 
and national origin discrimination more generally. Section 5 examines these 
guidelines and the issues raised by English-Only in the workplace cases in 
light of recent research on what are termed linguistic human rights. I con-
clude in section 6 by suggesting three ways those who are so inclined might 
seek to engage with the issues raised by this paper. Let me reiterate that I do 
not speak as an attorney, judge, or legislator. Hence, I am not authorized to 
make or interpret law, nor is that my goal here. My desire is rather to think 
about English-Only rules and rulings from the perspective of sociolinguistics 
in order to see what can be learned about language in society and in particu-
lar about ideologies of language-especially bilingualism-at work among 
scholars and the public. 
I begin with the confession that I had not given any real serious thought 
to matters of English-Only rules in the workplace until asked to serve as a 
witness. Like most sociolinguists, I felt I knew a considerable amount about 
public debates on whether English should be enshrined as the national 
language. Like many readers, perhaps, I had taught Bob King's (1997) 
article from the Atlantic Monthly on the issue and read books and articles on 
the topic. And like many of my students and colleagues, I was surprised to 
find that English-Only rules are ever justifiable in the workplace. 
But more careful reflection on workplace situations in a Hymesian sort 
of way reminds us that employers or their representatives who speak only 
English (or who do not speak all the languages spoken in the workplace) will 
likely need to supervise employees who may or may not speak English, that 
employers and their representatives will likewise need to work toward 
ensuring a workplace where no worker-monolingual or multilingual-feels 
intimidated or perhaps even excluded, and that employees may need to 
interact with a public having, on the one hand, a range of linguistic abilities 
and, on the other, a range of attitudes about hearing languages they do not 
understand spoken in their presence. I had never considered specifically 
whether some or all of these situations might justify a requirement to speak 
English in the workplace or a prohibition not to speak any language other 
than English there. The challenge of doing so-of thinking through specific 
situations from the perspective of research in sociolinguistics-is a useful 
one, I contend, for those of us seeking to understand language in its social 
contexts. 
In preparation to write the opinion I offered as expert witness and to 
draft this essay, I found that there is little existing research on English-Only 
in the workplace rules and rulings. Several articles in a section on "the 
question of minority language rights" in Crawford's (1992) source book on 
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the Official English controversy address relevant issues, especially Chen 
(1992), which considers issues of language rights in the private sector; 
excerpts from several potentially relevant court cases, in particular Gutierrez 
v. Municipal Court, which was later vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court and 
hence cannot stand as precedent; and an excerpt from a 1987 Harvard Law 
Review article on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as it might relate to language minorities. From a very different perspective, 
Kirtner (1995), in the Texas Law Review, provided what he termed "an 
extended critique of the [existing] English-Only cases" (p. 874) and con-
tended that the Courts should take a "minority-centric" perspective in these 
cases, rather than the "majority-centric" perspective that has been taken. I 
acknowledge two other relevant law review articles here, those of Perea 
(1990) and Behm (1998), but space does not permit me to consider them. 
2 Background on English-Only Rules in the Workplace 
English-Only rules and rulings are increasingly in the daily news, and they 
will likely remain there. In September 2000, nine assembly-line workers who 
had been sanctioned for violating Watlow Batavia Inc.'s English-Only in the 
workplace policy won a large out-of-court settlement with assistance of the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (Girion 2000a, 
Watlow 2000); one of these had lost her job for greeting a co-worker with 
"Buenos dias." A few weeks later, a group of thirteen English/Spanish 
bilingual telephone operators were awarded a record judgment against their 
former Dallas employer (EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc.). In the 
latter case, the company's English-Only policy mandated English at all 
times-"during free moments ... between calls, during lunch, in the employee 
break room, when making personal calls, and before and after work if in the 
building" (p. 4)-unless an operator was assisting a Spanish-speaking 
customer. The Hispanic plaintiffs, who had either refused to sign a memo 
agreeing to the policy, signed under protest, or voiced protest, lost their jobs, 
and they were replaced with non-Hispanic employees. According to Holmes 
(2000), citing EEOC data, charges filed by the agency on behalf of employ-
ees in response to complaints about English-Only in the workplace rules rose 
from 77 in 1996, the first year such complaints were tracked, to 253 in 1999. 
One may also read these figures as evidence of an increase in workplace 
policies mandating English only. Such an increase can be interpreted as a 
direct consequence of efforts to legislate English as the official language of 
the country, laws that would govern the public sector, as Chen (1992) did, or 
as an indirect consequence of larger social forces that might include anti-
immigrant sentiment, xenophobia, or racism. 
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Although many sociolinguists might immediately consider English-Only 
rules in the workplace from the perspective of the employee, who may or 
may not speak English, I find it useful to begin with the perspective of the 
employers because theirs is the position of power and they represent institu-
tions. Two recent treatments of English-Only in the workplace rules written 
for employers and managers are Cary and Seagull's white paper for the 
Society for Human Resource Management, "Beware the Native Tongue: 
National Origin and English-Only Rules" (2000) and Roffer and Sanserv-
ino's "Holding Employee's Native Tongues: English-Only Rules in the 
Workplace can be Legal when Executed Correctly" (2000). One needn't be a 
Foucauldian to expect the concerns of both documents to be systems of 
control, discipline, and punishment within the confines of the law. 
Roffer and Sanservino (2000), the more objective of the two, discussed 
the issue of English-Only in the workplace rules from the perspective of 
human resources personnel. They gave four sorts of situations in which 
employers might "benefit" from having English-Only rules (177): 
(1) Reducing ethnic tension, especially where separate languages have 
segregated an employer's workforce. 
(2) Improving employees' English proficiency, especially in companies 
with a primarily English-speaking customer base. 
(3) Enhancing the effectiveness of employee supervision. 
(4) Promoting safety and efficiency in the workplace. 
The language is theirs; I have merely numbered their bulleted list for easier 
reference. Numbers 1 and 2, in particular, make especially interesting as-
sumptions about language and its nature. As Kirtner (1995) pointed out 
while discussing assumptions like those represented by number one, the idea 
of reducing tension among various groups in the workplace by enforcing the 
use of English represents a decidedly majority-centric perspective on the 
matter, rather than the perspective of the members of the minority group, 
who can, thanks to such rules, speak only English, regardless of any chal-
lenges they might face in doing so, and who may not perceive the enforced 
use of English as reducing tension among ethnic groups. Reason 2, improv-
ing English proficiency, though laudatory, presumes that speaking a lan-
guage one does not speak natively will result in improved proficiency, 
automatically or necessarily perhaps. Such an assumption would be prob-
lematic to many who write about second or foreign language learning in 
most circumstances, especially those where the affective filter is high-as 
we might expect it to be for many bilinguals limited to one language in the 
workplace or employees just learning English there. Reason 2 also presumes, 
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of course, that the employee does not already speak English, a false assump-
tion in the case of many native-born bilinguals, who have received most if 
not all of whatever formal education they have in English. 
All those who write about English-Only rules in the workplace agree 
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended permits employees 
to challenge such rules under its guidelines on national origin discrimination. 
(Appendix A contains the most relevant sections of the Title VII Guidelines.) 
As Roffer and Sanservino pointed out, the EEOC guidelines are "inter-
pretive," "non-binding" guidelines (177), and certain federal courts have 
explicitly rejected aspects of them, especially those relating to questions of 
where the burden of proof is to be placed in cases about English-Only rules, 
while other courts have accepted the perspective of the guidelines. It is 
precisely because of the ''unsettled" state of the law in this area that English-
Only rules in the workplace are of interest to the legal profession, employers, 
and, one would hope, those of us who study language in society. In other 
words, because there are few agreed-upon delimiting cases and the various 
circuit courts do not agree on where to draw the relevant lines about what is 
or is not permissible and why, we have an ideal situation for thinking about 
competing ideologies, including ideologies about language. 
3 Ideologies of Language 
In preparing to write my expert opinion, I read a number of earlier court 
rulings about English-Only rules in the workplace. My motivation for doing 
so was not to make, practice, or interpret law as a policy maker, attorney, or 
judge might, but to familiarize myself with the universe of discourse I was 
entering. After all, in what was likely the first discussion in the Western 
tradition of what Bell (1984) later termed "audience design" and the first 
practical treatise about the nature of language in society, Aristotle (1991) 
taught that if one would persuade an audience of any argument, one is best 
served by understanding something about that audience. In this particular 
situation, I was interested in the sorts of arguments that had been made, the 
sorts of evidence that had been adduced, and, most importantly, the assump-
tions about language never stated but manifest throughout the arguments. 
Again, because the case for which I am a witness is pending and in the 
interest of space, I will not comment on specific cases, an analysis of which, 
from the perspective of critical linguistics, would be most revealing with 
regard to assumptions and reasoning about language. Instead, I will make a 
few general comments. 
I discovered, as noted, that the Courts have not spoken with one voice 
about English-Only in the workplace rules but I also observed that when they 
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have written about matters of bilingualism in these cases, they have gener-
ally and unproblematically assumed a balanced bilingual, one with equal 
abilities in both her or his languages, as the defining case. Yet those of us 
who live or conduct sociolinguistic research in bilingual communities are 
very aware of how rare balanced bilinguals are; indeed, we don't even expect 
to find them among people born and reared in the United States unless they 
have made unusual efforts to gain and maintain competence in the language 
they know in addition to English. 
In discussing bilingual behavior, Court decisions often discuss the idea 
of bilinguals' linguistic preference, and equally often, language choice is 
reduced to a matter of no more than individual preference. A metaphor to 
characterize the Court's position might be that of standing in front of an ice-
cream counter and choosing between chocolate and strawberry ice cream 
when one likes both and is allergic to neither. Yet even in the case of the 
mythical balanced bilingual, sociolinguists would contend that his or her 
patterns of language choice represent something far more complex than 
choosing a flavor of ice cream. The choices are constrained by the situation, 
the interlocutor(s), the history of their interactions, the topic or purpose of 
the interaction, the place where the interaction occurs, and their relative 
knowledge about the language abilities of the parties involved. 
Such an acknowledgment, more complex than the treatment of bilin-
gualism found in many Court cases, does not consider the linguistic con-
straints that might influence the nature of codeswitching bilinguals engage 
in. Interestingly, when writing about codeswitching, the Courts and newspa-
per accounts of rulings most often treat the phenomenon as a failure, an 
inability to (be able to) maintain one language, namely English, when 
speaking. In her article for the Los Angeles Times, for example, Girion 
(2000b) defined "code switching" for the paper's readers as "an unconscious 
tendency to lapse into a native language," a most infelicitous characteriza-
tion? Girion may well be following the lead of the attorneys in EEOC v. 
Premier Operator Services (2000). According to the expert witness for this 
case, Susan Berk-Seligson (p.c.), the source of this metaphor was most likely 
one of the attorneys for the EEOC rather than the expert witness herself. 
Indeed, the Plaintiff EEOC's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment characterized codeswitching using the metaphor of 
2
such a characterization certainly fails to meet the criterion of linguistic descriptions 
that DeBose (2001) has recently termed ideological adequacy, or linguistic descrip-
tions that represent the speakers of a variety in a fair, accurate, and dignified manner, 
to be added to the criteria of descriptive and explanatory adequacy, first offered by 
Chomsky (1965). 
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speakers' "lapsing into their language of origin" (p. 2). Neither Girion nor 
the Plaintiff EEOC's Brief cited a source for this characterization of code-
switching. 
Many, if not all, scholars writing about bilingualism, language choice, or 
codeswitching remind readers that choices of linguistic code are not "free" in 
any sense. As Myers Scotton (e.g., 1993) has often described the situation, 
speakers are free to choose among the codes in their repertoire but the 
possible social meanings of those choices are constrained by what she terms 
the markedness metric of the community. Yet, if you regularly teach about 
codeswitching in your classes, graduate or undergraduate, and your experi-
ences are like mine, you often get questions from students-multilinguals 
and monolinguals-about the nature of such choices. Even after reading the 
texts, students always want to raise issues of intentionality with respect to 
particular cases, and they delight in offering psychological accounts of why a 
speaker switched where she or he did. In fact, students generally read discus-
sions of the functions of codeswitching in a particular community as de-
scriptions of the intentions of language users. 
Although I seek to explain that no thinker I have run across has a good 
story to tell about the matter of intentionality, at least not as far as language 
choice is concerned, my students generally remain less than happy. Encour-
aging them to focus on the effect on the interaction of a specific 
switch-rather than is possible 'cause'- goes some way toward helping 
them think analytically about switching, but they are never quite satisfied. 
Similarly, students want to focus on whether or not speakers are consciously 
aware of matters of language choice, and, of course, all the bilinguals and 
multilinguals I know argue that sometimes they are but often they aren't. 
Because these questions arise regardless of the text we read, I am left to 
consider why they recur and if and how we should address them. 
Following my own advice and focusing on the effects of what we lin-
guists and sociolinguists do, rather than our intent, I would note that by using 
folk metaphors relating to 'choice' and 'preference' when discussing matters 
of language choice and codeswitching and by then treating them as terms of 
art imbued with connotations not present in ordinary language, we achieve 
several things, some of which we may not intend. We certainly register a 
welcomed voice for speaker agency, locating our discussions with regard to 
the long-standing debates among social theorists about the tension between 
structure and agency. But we may also be encouraging certain continued 
misunderstandings of bilingualism and codeswitching based on folk no-
tions-i.e., a particular set of language ideologies common throughout our 
society. In other words, in speaking up for speaker agency, we, through our 
choice of metaphors, likely simultaneously downplay the nature of con-
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straints of many sorts that influence the behavior of multilinguals as well as 
the diverse range of language abilities found in most, if not all bilingual 
communities, at least in the United States. Whatever we are doing right, we 
seem not to be heading off these misunderstandings among our students--or 
among those who might rely on our opinion or explanations. 
4 Examining the Language of the Title VII Guidelines 
Having considered how our own ideologies as analysts may create mis-
understandings of the phenomena we seek to explicate, I turn now to the 
language of the Title VII Guidelines, examining some of the questions it 
raises in terms of thinking about matters of language and discrimination. 
Contemporary American legal argumentation owes much to stasis theory of 
Classical Rhetoric, where one offered a judgment after considering questions 
of fact, definition, and evaluation. What American judges seek to do (or ask 
a jury to do) is to apply the law (a set of definitions in some sense) to a set of 
facts and evaluate the outcome; once the evaluation is made by the judge (or 
a jury), a judgment is issued. Hence, the analysis of the language and as-
sumptions of documents such as these guidelines is important because their 
language constrains what can and cannot be argued in significant ways. 
As noted in §1606.3, the scope of Title VII guidelines includes em-
ployment discrimination involving "race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin." Religion aside, these characteristics are considered in the cases I 
examined to be "immutable." Further, §1606.1 explains that national origin 
discrimination deals with the "physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics 
of a national origin group." Such a linking of language and immutable 
characteristics will immediately and rightly put some readers on guard. 
Those familiar with the history of American anthropology during the last 
century are well aware of how hard anthropologists worked to uncouple links 
between race, culture, and language. Those who have read much Boas and 
especially those familiar with the controversies surrounding his own personal 
beliefs and practices know how contentious present and past understandings 
of his work are, a topic I discussed in relation to the work of one of his 
students, Zora Neale Hurston (1999). The debates about Boas in some sense 
mirror contemporary arguments between essentialists, on the one hand, and 
social constructivists or postmodernists, on the other, about the nature of 
identity. (Interestingly, however, it is the latter group who are most likely to 
essentialize Boas and his work in any number of ways.) What these argu-
ments remind us is that matters of race, ethnicity, culture, language, and the 
body remain profoundly uncomfortable issues for Americans and that 
finding ways of analyzing them that make sense in the language of a par-
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ticular discourse of power-in this case, legal discourse-will likely prove 
intellectually challenging. 
Here, I offer a specific example. In the cases I examined, a distinction is 
rightly made between one's native language and what is termed one's 
primary language. Although I have not been able to locate the source of this 
latter construct, one's primary language often seems to be treated by the 
Courts as the one a person uses most frequently, is most comfortable using, 
feels most confident using, has the greater (or greatest) range of styles and 
registers in, and so on. (Sometimes, the primary language is assumed neces-
sarily to be the native language, a problematic assumption, I contend.) 
Certainly, most sociolinguists would be uncomfortable with any attempt to 
link primary language with a person's 'race', on the one hand, or national 
origin, on the other in some immutable fashion. At the same time, there must 
be some nonrandom and abiding-immutable-link between primary 
language and race or national origin if the Title VII Guidelines are to be 
relevant in any way. The exercise of thinking about matters of bilingualism 
and bilingual language use with such categories quickly demonstrates the 
brittleness of the "terministic screens" (Burke 1966) of both law and so-
ciolinguistics. 
5 English-Only Rules and Linguistic Human Rights 
It is especially interesting to examine English-Only in the workplace rules in 
light of research in the framework of linguistic human rights, much of which 
has come out of Europe and is associated with the work of Skutnabb-Kangas 
(e.g., Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1995b). Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillip-
son begin the introduction to an essay on the past and present state of such 
rights by noting: 
We will provisionally regard linguistic human rights in relation to the 
mother tongue(s) as consisting of the right to identify with it/them, and 
to education and public services through the medium of it/them ... .In 
relation to other languages we will regard linguistic human rights as 
consisting of the right to learn an official language in the country of 
residence, in its standard form (1995a, p. 71, emphasis theirs). 
In their work, they note that such rights are both individual and collec-
tive (Phillipson, Rannut, & Skutnabb-Kangas 1995, p. 2) and that discus-
sions of these rights are especially pertinent in light of the situation of 
linguistic minorities-indigenous peoples, immigrants (or migrants), and 
refugees, each of which may be treated quite differently as groups within a 
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given polity (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995a, p. 71). Although they 
use both "indigenous" and "autochthonous" without distinction, the authors 
appear to have in mind all native-born minorities, regardless of the prove-
nance of their ancestors. Hence, American Indians who speak an indigenous 
language, American-born bilingual Mexican-Americans, African-Americans 
who speak African-American Vernacular English natively, and Deaf signers 
of ASL could qualify as linguistic minorities for the purposes of (most?) 
discussions of linguistic human rights in the United States. Because these 
authors often tie linguicism, or prejudice based on language, to racism and 
ethnicism (prejudice based on a person's ethnicity or ethnic background), it 
is not clear how they would treat a group like speakers of Appalachian 
English, though they would surely be opposed to any sort of overt or covert 
discrimination based on language or language variety. 
In analyzing international covenants and national constitutions with re-
spect to their stance on linguistic rights in education, Skutnabb-Kangas and 
Phillipson considered two continua, which they map in Cartesian space: the 
degree of overtness of the rules (to what degree are minority languages and 
language rights mentioned?) and the degree of promotion (to what degree is 
a language prohibited, explicitly or implicitly tolerated, overtly or covertly 
proscribed as a basis for discrimination, permitted, or actively promoted?). 
With respect to the first criterion, overtness, the Title VII Guidelines ex-
plicitly mention language and languages other than English that can be 
related to national origin. At the same time, their primary focus appears to be 
limiting the total imposition of English in the workplace in an effort to 
prevent national origin discrimination rather than protecting a language other 
than English for any reason other than preventing such discrimination. Thus, 
with respect to matters of promotion, we might contend that while mandating 
the use of English at all times is proscribed (or at least automatically subject 
to "close scrutiny") and requiring English (only) is permissible if the re-
quirement can be shown to be a "business necessity," languages other than 
English, provided they can be linked to national origin, are to be tolerated. 
In their discussion of linguicism, the authors contend that it is repro-
duced by glorification of the majority and its language(s), the stigmatization 
of the minority and its language(s ), and rationalizations that justify the status 
of each by favoring the majority, whether in terms of the value of its lan-
guage(s), essentially constructed, or its noblesse oblige, in granting rights 
and assistance to a minority. One easily finds evidence of these processes in 
Hernandez-Chcivez's (1995) analysis in the same volume of language policy 
in the U.S. and in much English-Only discussion. 
I note that in citing this work on linguistic human rights, I do not wish to 
be seen as giving this framework my unfettered support. As Skutnabb-
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Kangas and Phillipson acknowledge, many details remain to be worked out 
regarding this way of thinking about language in society. Certainly, I do not 
feel I have adequately worked through the potential or likely consequences 
of taking language to be a human right. Because of the power granted the 
discourse of human rights, I hope for additional discussion of the value and 
limitations of this framework, which may well prove useful for further 
analysis of English-Only rules. 
6 Courses of Action? 
Having been a student of sociolinguistics for going on three decades now, I 
can imagine some readers may wish to engage with the issues raised by 
English-Only rules and rulings. As I sometimes note in classes I teach, 
sociolinguists are often expected to act as the conscience of the larger disci-
pline, and our research or at least the topics we work on get trotted out in 
discussions of the discipline's relevance or usefulness, especially to life 
outside the academy. Because we are dealing with issues of law, federal 
regulations, and their interpretation, we are not in a position to make or 
interpret law except for the few sociolinguists who have law degrees; such 
prerogatives belong to the legislature, policy makers, and the courts. 
However, it seems there are at least three possible avenues for engage-
ment. First, waiting by the phone in case an attorney calls is one possibility. 
Yet, despite the poet John Milton's claim that ''They also serve who only 
stand and wait" (1655), this alternative seems as unproductive as buying 
lottery tickets. A second alternative, one more likely to appeal to the political 
activists among readers, is to lobby the folks who create laws, write regula-
tions, and appoint judges if one wants clarification of or changes in the laws. 
A final alternative, one of a different sort, is to give serious thought to how 
we present or fail to present information about issues relevant to this and 
related topics in our teaching. 
In considering this avenue for engagement, I wish to make clear that I 
am not imagining teaching students the specifics of English-Only legislation 
in the workplace or elsewhere from the perspective of the law-once again, 
we are not attorneys. Rather, I wonder if we might not engage the various 
perspectives involved-those of the employers, the employees, whether hi-
or multilingual and monolingual, the law, and our society-as a way of 
examining matters of one's place in the social order and language ideology. 
Reading and analyzing the short article by Roffer and Sanservino or the 
white paper by Carey and Seagull, the perspectives they take on English-
Only rules in the workplace, the assumptions about language they represent, 
and the limits of those assumptions, for example, would make an interesting 
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assignment as would a comparison and contrast of the two. One could 
similarly compare Girion's (2000a) news article about the Watlow case and 
the company's press release about the settlement. 
I think too about the kinds of information we provide about the nature of 
bi- and multilingualism, codeswitching and code choice, along with the very 
real limitations of popular and professional metaphors of 'choice' and 
'preference', among others. Finally, I wonder about the courses we choose to 
teach and the issues we choose to raise in those we do. Too often, it seems, 
we fear applying disciplinary knowledge to specific social circumstances, 
preferring instead vague generalizations about the systematicity of all lan-
guage varieties and the evil of dialect prejudice. 
For those who, like Hymes (1973), believe sociolinguistics should have 
some liberatory potential, we've got a ways to go to get there. Part of the 
challenge, even more so now than in 1973, is deciding on the possible 
meanings of 'liberatory', figuring out who is being liberated, from and into 
what, who gets to decide the answers to these complex questions, and what 
languages they will use while doing so. 
Appendix A: Part 1606. Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of National Origin (Sections Relevant to 
English-Only in the Workplace Rules) 
§1606.1 Definitions of national origin discrimination. 
The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly, as includ-
ing, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because 
of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, origin; or because an individual 
has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin 
group .... 
§1606.2. The scope of title VII protection. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, protects individuals 
against employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or na-
tional origin. The title VII principles of disparate treatment and adverse 
impact equally apply to national origin discrimination. These Guidelines 
apply to all entities covered by Title VII (collectively referred to as "em-
ployer''). 
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§1606.6 Selection procedures. 
(b) The Commission has found that the use of the following selection proce-
dures may be discriminatory on the basis of national origin. Therefore, it will 
carefully investigate charges involving these selection procedures for both 
disparate treatment and adverse impact on the basis of national origin. 
However, the Commission does not consider these to be exceptions to the 
"bottom line" concept: 
(i) Fluency-in-English requirements, such as denying employment oppor-
tunities because of an individual's foreign accent* or inability to com-
municate well in English.* ... 
1606.7 Speak-English-Only rules. 
(i) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only 
English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition 
of employment. The primary language of an individual is often an es-
sential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, 
in the workplace, from speaking their primary language, or the language 
they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment 
opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an at-
mosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national ori-
gin which could result in a discriminatory working environment. There-
fore, the Commission will presume that such a rule violates title VII and 
will closely scrutinize it. 
(ii) When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule 
requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where 
the employer can show that the rule is justified as a business necessity. 
(iii) Notice of the rule. It is common for individuals whose primary language 
is not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speak-
ing their primary language. Therefore, if an employer believes it has a 
business necessity for a speak-English-only rule at certain times, the 
employer should inform its employees of the general circumstances 
when speaking only in English is required and of the consequences of 
violating the rule. If an employer fails to effectively notify its employees 
of the rules and makes an adverse employment decision against an indi-
vidual based on a violation of the rule, the Commission will consider the 
employer's application of the rule as evidence of discrimination on the 
basis of national origin .... 
*Indicates .footnote, which gives references to additional federal law, including 
earlier EEOC rulings. 
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